Soc Neurosci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 Jul 2.

Published in final edited form as:

Soc Neurosci. 2015; 10(5): 527–550.

Published online 2015 Feb 20. doi:  10.1080/17470919.2015.1013223

PMCID: PMC5494206

NIHMSID: NIHMS788078

PMID: 25697184

Understanding Social Hierarchies: The Neural and Psychological Foundations of Status Perception

Jessica Koski, Hongling Xie, and Ingrid R. Olson

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Abstract

Social groups across species rapidly self-organize into hierarchies, where members vary in their level of power, influence, skill, or dominance. In this review we explore the nature of social hierarchies and the traits associated with status in both humans and nonhuman primates, and how status varies across development in humans. Our review finds that we can rapidly identify social status based on a wide range of cues. Like monkeys, we tend to use certain cues, like physical strength, to make status judgments, although layered on top of these more primitive perceptual cues are socio-cultural status cues like job titles and educational attainment. One's relative status has profound effects on attention, memory, and social interactions, as well as health and wellness. These effects can be particularly pernicious in children and adolescents. Developmental research on peer groups and social exclusion suggests teenagers may be particularly sensitive to social status information, but research focused specifically on status processing and associated brain areas is very limited. Recent evidence from neuroscience suggests there may be an underlying neural network, including regions involved in executive, emotional, and reward processing, that is sensitive to status information. We conclude with questions for future research as well as stressing the need to expand social neuroscience research on status processing to adolescents.

Keywords: status, dominance, adolescence, popularity, neural

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1. Introduction

From childhood sports competitions and spelling bees, to grade point averages and prom kings and queens, we learn early in life to view our social world in terms of who is better, smarter, or more favored than everyone else. Even as adults, we are quick to identify status symbols such as foreign cars, big houses, and career titles. The ease with which we perceive status cues and assign rank to others reflects a general preference for a hierarchical social organization (Zitek & Tiedens, 2012), perhaps because understanding where we stand relative to others is essential for defining social roles and promoting successful social interaction (Halevy, Chou, & Galinsky, 2011; Savin-Williams, 1979). We undoubtedly vary in the skills and traits we possess, and when choosing the appropriate person to listen to, follow, or emulate, we want someone with the skills and traits we consider the most desirable or important. Thus, organizing social groups in a hierarchical manner is an efficient way to maximize group cohesion and productivity, and the ability to readily perceive status cues in others is an important social skill.

The purpose of social hierarchies is to organize social groups in order to allocate limited resources, such as mates and food (Sapolsky, 2005), facilitate social learning (Henrich & Mcelreath, 2003), and maximize individual motivation (Halevy et al, 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). By definition, some individuals within the hierarchy – those at the top - will be afforded more resources and benefits than others, thus affecting morbidity and mortality. Despite that fact that there are always losers in this scenario, social hierarchies are highly pervasive across human cultures (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and they appear to emerge naturally in social groups (Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Chase, Tovey, Spangler-Martin, & Manfredonia, 2002; Gould, 2002; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Further, this group organization is not strictly a product of human cognition, as almost every group-living species demonstrates a natural tendency to organize into a social hierarchy (Sapolsky, 2004; 2005) where the higher-ranking members possess more power, influence, and advantages than the lower-ranking members (Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011; Mazur, 1985; Zitek & Tiedens, 2012).

The prevalence of hierarchies and their similarities across species suggest an innate preference, or utility, in the differentiation of power and a possible evolutionary origin (Mazur, 1985). We would expect, then, that humans are equipped with mechanisms for rapidly perceiving status information and recognizing their relative status roles, and that sensitivity to status information is present early in life. However, the neural mechanisms underlying status perception and judgment in humans are only recently gaining attention, and findings remain relatively vague. Even sparser is research regarding the effects of neural maturation on status perception, and how developmental changes in status processing influence the value and impact of social rank.

In this review, we integrate findings from animal, human social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience to argue that status is a prominent feature in social perception, and that understanding how we process status information on a neural and cognitive level is essential to understanding the profound impact status has on social attention and behavior. Additionally, we suggest exploring developmental changes in status perception to better understand adolescent behaviors like peer pressure and bullying.

This review has three aims. First, we address the evolutionary origins of social hierarchies by examining status cues across non-human primate species. Second, we review the current literature on the neural mechanisms underlying the perception and processing of social rank in humans, and discuss the relevance of this work to understanding the impact social status has on social cognition. Finally, we discuss the development of social hierarchies and propose that the neural basis of status processing contributes to developmental changes in hierarchy formation and the value placed on status, and that this has important consequences. We draw from the current literature on brain development and peer relations to propose that developmental changes in neural sensitivity to social feedback can provide insight into social status processing in children and teens.

1.1. Definitions of Terms

We recognize that a variety of disciplines have conducted research on social status from different approaches, and thus a variety of terms appear in the literature. Here we briefly define the status terms referenced in this review.

To begin, hierarchy refers to the ranking of members in social groups based on the power, influence, or dominance they exhibit, whereby some members are superior or subordinate to others (Fiske, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Mazur, 1985; Zitek & Tiedens, 2012). Rank is a term often used to objectively refer to where one falls within the hierarchy, and is conceptually similar to the ordinal ranking of numerical values along a number line (Chiao, Bordeaux, & Nalini Ambady, 2004; Chiao et al., 2009). Status, on the other hand, can be measured through social opinion or reputation (Gould, 2002), and is generally associated with admiration and respect (Anderson, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006; Fiske, 2010; Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011). The terms “status” and “rank” are often used interchangeably or in conjunction (e.g., Mazur, 1985), as they both represent the higher positions in a social hierarchy.

A number of studies discussed in this review measure or manipulate power or dominance, rather than objective rank. This is because power and dominance are frequently associated with status and are often used to infer the status of others (e.g. Fragale et al., 2011). Power implies control over resources or other group members and is distinguished from dominance as a contextual trait (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Fragale et al., 2011). Dominance is associated with the ability to acquire resources (e.g., (Hawley, 1999), and therefore can be a predictor of power (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002) and a means of establishing status across species (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Chase, 1980; 1982; Mazur, 1985). Thus, dominance can be viewed as a behavior or personality trait that leads to inequalities in power among group members, and thereby differentiates status.

Dominance can be divided into sociable and aggressive subscales (Kalma, Visser, & Peeters, 1993). These two subscales emphasize that power, or access to resources, can be obtained through aggressive, dominant behaviors, or through prosocial, cooperative actions. Similarly, dominance is contrasted with another dimension of social status – prestige. The correlation between status and prestige may have emerged to facilitate social learning, whereby group members display deference to those who possess qualities deemed valuable (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013). Thus, individuals with high prestige maintain influence over the group, but without displaying the force or threat implied by dominance. This distinction will be revisited later, when we discuss status cues and attainment.

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2. The Nature of Social Hierarchies

2.1. Structure, Formation and Function

A wealth of evidence indicates social hierarchies are endemic, innate, and most likely, evolved to support survival within a group-living context. While social hierarchies can vary in their specific details, there are shared, definitive features that can be discussed more broadly. Specifically, hierarchies across species are characterized by (a) the ranking of group members who vary in physical or intellectual capacities; (b) rapid and spontaneous formation; and (c) functional and adaptive value to the existence of the social group. Despite some cross-species variability, there is strong evidence that hierarchies arise out of necessity and their existence is beneficial to social groups.

First, inherent to the definition of a social hierarchy is the stratified ranking of group members along a valued dimension, with some members being superior or subordinate to others, and fewer members occupying the highest positions (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). This ‘valued dimension’ can be a behavior signifying dominance, such as overpowering an opponent in a conflict interaction (Mazur, 1985; Zumpe & Michael, 1986), or a skill or trait considered ideal by the group (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Hogg, 2001). Both individual characteristics and the outcomes of interactions among group members appear to influence hierarchy establishment (Chase, 1980; Chase et al., 2002), as well as asymmetries in dominance and affiliation (Newton-fisher, 2004; Pellegrini & Bartini, 2001; de Waal, 1986). The underlying concept, however, is that hierarchy formation is the result of individual variation in influence or power and the most valued member achieves the highest status (e.g, Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Additionally, social ranking can occur on a small or large scale, within or across groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Particularly in humans, rank is not limited to the actual observation of a dominant or valued trait, but is often the product of group consensus, or reputation (Gould, 2002). As a result, the structure of human hierarchies is multidimensional, largely context or group dependent, and self-reinforcing.

Second, hierarchies form quickly and spontaneously among group-living animals. Several findings suggest that positions of superiority or deference are rapidly identified through asymmetrical displays of dominance. For instance, a nonverbal cue as simple as gaze aversion indicates status roles immediately among monkeys meeting for the first time (Deaner, Khera, & Platt, 2005). Similarly, unfamiliar humans automatically display asymmetries in dominance behaviors in paired interactions, adopting either a dominant or submissive posture complementary to that exhibited by the other person (Markey, Funder, & Ozer, 2003; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). Further evidence suggests that humans rapidly attribute status information to others (Moors & Houwer, 2005), and they spontaneously organize into a hierarchical structure (e.g., Berger et al. 1980; Gould, 2002). Humans also demonstrate high levels of consistency when making status judgments about both themselves and group members (Anderson et al., 2006). Finally, there is often a decline in aggressive interactions and increase in cooperative behaviors following the establishment of a hierarchy (La Freniere & Chariesworth, 1983; Strayer & J. Strayer, 1976) suggesting that status roles are quickly determined and accepted. These findings highlight the salience of status cues and the rapid acknowledgement of where one falls within the developing social hierarchy.

Importantly, the organization of social groups into a hierarchy serves an adaptive function that benefits the group as a whole. When essential resources are limited, individual skills vary, and reproductive fitness determines survival, hierarchies are an efficient way to divide goods and labor among group members. Thus, an important function of the hierarchy may be to define social roles (Halevy et al., 2011) and allocate limited resources (Sapolsky, 2005). A second function may be to increase the survival of high-status members, who possess the most favored traits of the group, and provide them with greater influence over other members. In nonhuman primates specifically, hierarchies favor the reproductive success of the highest-ranking members (Dewsbury, 1982). In humans, hierarchies encourage everyone to defer to the individuals who possess a skill or trait valued by the group, which may be an adaptive component of social learning (Henrich & McElreath, 2003). For instance, we tend to learn from and follow those who know more or have more than we do, because we revere their success. In this sense, deferring to ‘successful’ individuals in higher positions of status is advantageous to the group as a whole, given that these individuals presumably possess ideal knowledge or characteristics. Finally, in favor of the overall well-being of the group, the advantages afforded to higher-ranking members, and the prestige, may serve as a powerful motivating factor resulting in an increase in productivity of the group as a whole (Halevy et al, 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).

2.2. Status Characteristics in Monkeys and Human Adults

Social primates are sensitive to a similar suite of behaviors and traits that serve to establish and convey status (see Table 1), although some factors are uniquely human. These cues can be neatly divided into two categories: perceptual cues and knowledge-based cues. The across-species commonalities suggest an evolved origin for attaining high status and recognizing status in others, and they hint at a potential for status-dedicated neural processing networks. Here we describe traits associated with both actual status and perceptions of status in nonhuman primates and human adults.